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Abstract— This paper presents a modeling approach that has 
been developed within the SPAD project for analysing 
consequences of automation degradation in large socio-technical 
systems. This modeling approach involves two different 
notations: FRAM [6] and HAMSTERS [2], [8]. In previous work 
[7] we have proposed a synergistic approach integrating these 
two views for describing the evolution of system performances 
under automation degradation. The focus of the paper is on how 
the outcome of the models can be integrated to analyse system 
behavior. After describing the principles of such integration we 
exemplify it by using a standalone ATM simulator, and analysing 
the possible degradations of a system for managing unmanned 
aircraft (RPAS). 
Keywords-component; Automation degradation, resilience, 
performance, ATC, RPAS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The SESAR initiative intends to deal with the increase of 
traffic demand and the new business challenges that the ATM 
system will have to afford in the coming future. The increase of 
automation is one of the basic elements of all the solutions 
identified by SESAR to deal with such problems. Automation 
will support, and in some long term cases even completely 
replace human tasks, in order to meet the new capacity and 
efficiency needs. Human operators will be able in this way to 
manage a higher number of tasks and will shift toward more 
strategic roles and supervision activities in ATM. SESAR 
projects are validating tools and new operating procedures 
supporting controllers in conflict detection and resolution, as 
well as higher levels of automation for data gathering and 
management.  
However, automation brings a range of new challenges 
including those related to possible degradations. In particular, 
high levels of automation imply low system flexibility. A 
system which has been carefully planned, and thus 
standardized and automated, is hardly able to deal with non-
standard and unplanned events such as those caused by 
technical failures. In addition, the components of a highly 
automated system are usually tightly interconnected. The 
consolidation programme of the ATM architecture will lead to 
fewer and fewer control centres through Europe. Contribution 
to this increased interconnection will also come from the new 
gate-to-gate solutions, from the implementation of the SWIM 
architecture with less information asymmetries, and from the 
tighter links among all the stakeholders needed to offer a 
coherent and homogeneous service and interoperability. 
Increased coupling may make harder to identify and isolate 
failures when they occur, and to detect minor malfunctions 
before they propagate to the whole system. Then, coupling and 
lack of flexibility can bring to a higher sensitivity of the ATM 
system to degradation problems. 
Current models that support safety evaluation focus on 
systems before operation or on post-accident analysis. These 
models consider possible deviations, malfunctions, errors, or 
"after the fact" information. Even if these models have been 
very successful in the past and contributed to the very good 
safety achievements of the ATM system, they risk to be less 
adequate in a highly dynamic, and coupled system, that adapt 
dynamically to ensure user-preferred trajectories and to balance 
the demand. To manage properly the consequences of 
automation degradation we would need to be in condition to 
understand, monitor and control its propagation. We also need 
to be able to confine and absorb degradation problems (both 
with and without human contribution), and to understand and 
estimate the implications of degradations for the overall ATM 
system performances. 
In this paper we describe the use of a federation of models 
(advancing other the limit of the current models) supporting 
safety evaluation. The approach has been developed within the 
project System Performances under Automation Degradation 
(SPAD). Within the course of the project the federation has 
been applied on a large case study to evaluate its ability to: 
· understand, model and estimate the propagation of 
automation degradation in ATM; 
· evaluate and estimate the consequences on ATM 
performances; 
· support an effective intervention for the containment 
of automation degradation. 
Section II introduces the models that have been selected to 
build the federation discussing how they collaborate to the 
system analysis. Section III describes how the federation can 
be applied and how the different models collaborate in order to 
support assessment of degradations impact. Section IV 
describes a case study regarding a large system with high level 
of automation, and how different types of failures and the 
related propagation of degradation were simulated. Section V 
shows an example of the information, provided by the 
federation, to support the evaluation of the system under 
analysis. Section VI concludes with a discussion of the 
problems and limitation experienced using the SPAD approach. 
II. FEDERATION AND INTERACTION BETWEEN MODELS 
The federation defined in SPAD combines models offering 
different perspectives of the system under study and analysing 
it at different levels of granularity. Since we focus on a specific 
aspect of ATM (its ability to contain and manage automation 
degradation) we don't need a full abstraction of the ATM 
system. We can select models whose joint capabilities offer 
sufficient information for the questions of interest. In 
particular, we focussed on the propagation of automation 
degradation and the related influences on performances, 
limiting our investigation to the related aspects of the ATM 
system. We did not develop a large scale stand-alone model but 
combined in a federation a set of selected models, focussing on 
essential specific aspects of the systems. Each model 
investigates specific characteristics and represents a part of the 
whole ATM system with variable levels of granularity (from 
coarse to fine grain) depending on the interest of the analysis.  
Using multiple models to represent different facets of the 
system under consideration has been the trend for many years 
in the area of software (with the 9 notations of UML [11]) and 
more recently of systems (with 2 additional notations of 
SySML [12] with respect to UML). The approach we adopted 
extends that kind of work to encompass the multiple and more 
diverse facets of Large Socio-Technical Systems (LSSTS). In 
addition, we use compatible representations and format across 
models and reference a shared and correlated environment 
facilitating the integration of information and the analysis. 
The federation of models can work at different levels of 
abstractions from the single system till the top system of 
systems level. At the system level models consider what is 
required for the system to carry out its operations and to 
manage and possibly tolerate possible degradations. When 
considering this system in integration with other systems the 
models consider interaction and coupling between the different 
systems, to understand and measure degradation propagation 
and the link with the overall performances.  
The federation of models used in SPAD consists of the 
Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) and of the 
Human-centered Assessment and Modeling to Support Task 
Engineering for Resilient Systems (HAMSTERS). FRAM [1] 
is a safety management method aiming to support both 
accident investigation and risk assessment processes based on a 
set of principle related to complex socio-technical systems 
structure and dynamic. FRAM describes system functions 
characterising six basic relationships between them: input, 
output, preconditions, resources, controls, and timing. For 
example, the left side of figure 1 shows the six basic aspects of 
the function “Monitor traffic and separation”. This 
characterisation can be used to derive all the potential 
couplings among functions, even if they were not part of 
system design, and to instantiate them in specific scenarios. 
The functional modelling of FRAM is recursive and this 
facilitates its application at different levels of granularity, very 
high level when large portions of the ATM system are 
considered or more detailed when focussing on a small set of 
systems. This refinement is illustrated in the right part of figure 
1, where the function “Monitor traffic and separation” (left-
hand side of the figure) is refined into five sub-functions. This 
refinement ability provides support for the representation of a 
larger number of functions while keeping the model 
 
 
Figure 1: Function “Monitor traffic and separation” represented with FRAM 
 
representation understandable. 
HAMSTERS [2], [8] is a notation designed for representing 
the decomposition of human goals into tasks. The notation 
embeds several types of tasks that include: tasks done by a 
human, by an automated system, interactive tasks (between 
human and system), and generic. Tasks are represented as 
special nodes in a hierarchical structure. Temporal 
relationships are described by operators and quantitative time is 
represented by expressing task duration, minimum and 
maximum execution time and delay before tasks availability. 
The HAMSTERS notation supports the analysis of the 
complexity of the operators’ tasks and thus can also support the 
identification of which tasks are good candidate for allocation 
to the system [3]. 
Within some past project case studies [16] we also 
evaluated the possible use in the federation of ICO [13], [14]. 
ICO is a formal description technique dedicated to the 
modeling of interactive applications. This formalism makes it 
possible to describe the entire interactive application including 
both behavioral aspects (states and state changes) and 
interaction aspects (events triggered by the user interface and 
the graphical rendering) [4]. However, for the large case study 
described in this paper the complexity of the representation and 
the difficulties in information compatibility suggested to 
restrict the federation to FRAM and HAMSTERS only. 
III. USE OF THE FEDERATION 
A. The Application Process defined in SPAD 
The models of the SPAD federation are not intended to be 
used as stand-alone models but rather to support the analyst 
during his analysis. The analyst is the mediator of the 
interaction between the models and he is the manager of the 
federation, as shown in figure 2.  
The process defined within SPAD to apply the federation 
starts with the identification and characterisation of the system 
under analysis. The aim is to identify the object under 
investigation, that is the system under analysis to which the 
federation will be applied, and the conditions under which we 
intend to evaluate it. This entails the identification of the 
system components that will be considered during the 
modelling and evaluation, its operational condition and the 
main assumptions and simplifications that are adopted for the 
analysis. This allowed a shared understanding of the system so 
that both models refer to the same object, under the same 
operational conditions and assumptions. During this phase we 
identify not only the nominal condition, but also those 
perturbations we may want to explore during the analysis. For 
example, we may be interested in the consequences associated 
to different types of possible degradations.  
In the following step the system description is translated 
into functions that are then modelled with FRAM with the 
characterisation of the six basic relationships, for example 
control (one function controls the execution or timing of 
another one), input/output (the output of one function serves as 
input of another one), timing, resources and so on. A full and 
satisfactory representation of the system may require different 
iterations in which details are identified and added. 
Representations may include different levels of granularity 
(from coarse to fine grain) depending on the interest of the 
analysis as already shown in figure 1.  
All the relationships are dynamic and depend from the 
situation in which the system is operating and are specific for 
the scenario under study. Once the scenario has been chosen 
the analyst identifies all the relationships between the 
functions, ending up with a graphical representation similar to 
the one shown in figure 3. This is called an instantiation of the 
system under a specific scenario and is the basis for studying 
the possible evolution of the interrelation between the functions 
for that scenario. 
Last step is the study of the interrelation between the 
functions, for a given scenario. This step focusses on the 
possible consequences that may affect system performance 
adversely, identifying the downstream functions that are more 
influenced. On the basis of this study the analyst can identify 
ways for monitoring and control the output of the functions 
(e.g. introducing indicators and barriers, modifying the design 
or the procedures, etc.) limiting the possible negative 
consequences. 
The behaviour of each function, that is, what is produced as 
output (e.g. timing, resource, constraint) for a specific input, is 
identified using the FRAM methodology and associated tables 
[6]. When humans are a key element of the function or when 
temporal and quantitative aspects are important the behaviour 
is defined using HAMSTERS notation and tool. For example, 
HAMSTERS can help in understanding the temporal properties 
of the function and the temporal relationships during its 
execution.  
HAMSTERS offers representations and format compatible 
with FRAM, ensuring meaningful and compatible analysis 
about the entities used for the analysis. The federation employs 
repositories and representations where data used by the models 
are recorded, ensuring an easy transfer of information between 
FRAM HAMSTERS 
Analyst 
System under 
analysis 
Outcome of 
the analysis 
Figure 2: Role of the analyst 
them. These include the functional representation of the system 
and the different system instantiations. 
 
 
B. Application for Monitoring Purposes 
We have seen as the analyst remains the manager of the 
interactions between the models in the SPAD federation. The 
application process requires a significant contribution from the 
analysts and cannot be completely automated and used 
autonomously in real time conditions.  
The optimal way to use the SPAD federation is to 
investigate through scenarios a few different operational 
conditions (e.g. level of traffic, competence of staff) and the 
possible set of events that could generate from them, including 
different possible degradation. Let us represent the space of the 
possible operational conditions (normal and abnormal) as a 
two-dimensional space with one axis for all the possible normal 
operation conditions (that is, all possible combinations of 
aspects such as traffic levels, competences of staff, etc.) and 
one axis for all the possible degradations. We can then 
evidence the events analysed with the federation as grey areas 
Figure 3: FRAM instantiation at of ATM function for an Unmanned Aircraft flying in non segregated airspace 
2 4 
Figure 4: Space of the operational conditions 
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as in figure 4. For example, in the figure we studied two 
possible normal operational conditions between all those that 
are possible (areas 1 and 2), that is two possible combinations 
of traffic levels, competence of staff, etc. Then, for one of them 
(area 2) we studied also three degradation events of different 
severity (areas 3, 4 and 5).  
This "off line" approach is very useful for system design or 
to contribute to system assessment, that is, to understand what 
may happen in the future to the system. However, it is of 
limited use for monitoring purposes, when we intend to 
monitor a system and understand what is happening to it at run 
time. Since real time monitoring was one of the SPAD 
objectives we studied also how to use the federation in such a 
case (even if with some significant limitations). In this 
monitoring application the federation has been used off line to 
explore in advance a limited number of possible future events 
and estimate their possible consequences. If we consider the 
space of the possible operational conditions (normal and 
abnormal) of figure 4, this means to investigate a portion of 
this space, like the one represented by the 5 grey areas. Then, 
the system functioning is monitored at real time and if there is 
evidence that one of the explored events is going to happen, the 
estimate about the possible consequences are used to manage 
the event.  
Figure 5 shows in deep black the trajectory of the system 
within the space of the operational conditions evidencing how 
it degrades and then returns to the axis of the normal 
operational conditions. While doing this the system "crosses" 
some of the grey areas that have been explored by the 
federation and for which we have collected information during 
the off-line analysis. These information are used to manage the 
related event. 
IV. CASE STUDY AND SIMULATOR 
This section describes the application of the approach 
presented above in a case study regarding a system with a high 
level of automation and how this case study has been explored 
in a simulator. 
The case study regards a large portion of airspace with a 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS), and where 
Remotely Piloted Aircraft (RPA) are able to self separate from 
each other and from the surrounding commercial traffic using 
automated self separation algorithms and ADS-B based 
localisation devices. Remote Pilots (RP) supervise the flight of 
the RPA and intervene only in case of malfunctions or 
unforeseen events. Commercial aircraft are managed by Air 
Traffic Controllers (ATCO) under the 4D concept. The RP can 
also intervene modifying the trajectory of the RPA if required 
by an ATCO or other authorised personnel. For this reason we 
adopted the acronym RPAS even if the aircraft is using its own 
self separation algorithm. The procedure adopted for both the 
RPAS flying procedures and the management of the possible 
malfunctions are in line with the strategy proposed in the 
SESAR study ICONUS (Initial CON OPS for UAS in 
SESAR).  
The airspace is inspired to the real Italian airspace as shown 
in figure 6. There are four ACC (Milano, Padova, Roma and 
Brindisi) whose borders are identified by dashed lines in figure 
6. There are 40 waypoints that can be used to build different 
flight-paths, connecting 5 airports (Roma, Brindisi, Venezia, 
Catania and Milano) and foreign destinations outside the 
airspace.  
A 
B 
Figure 6: Airspace used by the simulator 
2 4 
Figure 5: Real time monitoring 
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 The simulator is able to reproduce different commercial 
traffic levels and different RPA crossing portions of non 
segregated airspace while flying from one segregated airspace 
to another one.  
For example in figure 6 there is a commercial aircraft 
(represented with a black arrow point) flying from Milan to 
Catania and a RPA (represented with a black V shaped arrow 
point) flying from the segregated area A in Apulia to the 
segregated area B in Sicily. During the flight the RPA crosses 
different possible commercial flight paths including the one of 
the flight from Milan to Catania, should this cause a possible 
conflict the RPA will leave the priority to the commercial 
flight.  
The simulator is also able to reproduce possible RPAS 
failures and the possible consequences on traffic and airspace 
functionality. In particular, it can simulate three failures with 
growing levels of severity:  
· interruption of the communication channel between 
RPA and RP (the RPA is still able to self-separate 
from the other aircraft, however it cannot be 
monitored and supervised effectively by the RP);  
· interruption of the communication channel and failure 
of the self-separation algorithm (the ATCO is able to 
recognize that an emergency event is taking place and 
to identify the area of the problem); 
· interruption of the communication channel, failure of 
the self-separation algorithm and failure of the self 
localisation device of the RPA (there is a failure of the 
ADS-B service and localisation is only possible 
through radar).   
Figure 7 shows the way we use the simulator. We generate 
different possible operational conditions and analyse them 
applying the federation of models as described in the previous 
Section.  
The input generator can create all the possible normal 
operational conditions (equivalent of the Y axis of figure 4). 
These normal operational conditions can be combined with the 
possible degradations (equivalent of the X axis of figure 4) in 
the simulator. We have as output of the simulation the 
operational conditions (equivalent of the X, Y space of fig. 4).  
V. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL 
In this Section we show an example of application of the 
federation to one of the cases generated by the simulator. In 
particular, we are considering Normal Traffic Level and 
combining it with the most severe of the degradation. The 
communication channel and self-separation algorithm of the 
RPA fail in combination with an ADS-B failure. The RPA data 
(label, flight level and so on) become invisible to the ATCO 
and the RP. The ATCO can still locate the RPA position on the 
horizontal level through the radar, and use its position to set a 
no fly area for the commercial traffic to ensure separation with 
the (non responding) RPA. The safety area is defined taking 
into account the last known RPA FL and trajectory. The area 
must be wide enough to tolerate RPA unexpected trajectory 
deviations without violating safety distances with other aircraft. 
The ATCO working in the sector interested by the RPA failure 
inform about the problem the different ATCO of the 
surrounding sectors, which may be affected by traffic 
deviations or that are about to take the RPA in charge. 
Through FRAM is it possible to identify a set of functions 
related to the scenario and provide a detailed description of 
each related factors (Time, Precondition and so on). We have 
already seen in figure 1 a function called “Monitor traffic and 
separation” in which the executive (EXC) controller monitors 
the current traffic situation (aircraft speed and positions, 
trajectories, separation) and anticipating future situations in his 
airspace of competence. Once all the functions are defined it is 
possible to create the instantiation.  
Figure 3 shows an example of instantiation for this specific 
scenario, when the RPA is flying in the Air Control Center 
(ACC) of the ATCO (ACC1). The EXC controller of this ACC 
is “Monitoring traffic and separation” and the figure shows the 
relations between this function and all the other functions.  
All the functions can be affected variability sources [5] 
(some of them are reported in the following table). These can 
be associated to human factors (i.e. Situational Awareness) 
and/or to system side (i.e. Traffic and its Complexity) and can 
affect both the function itself and/or also its output. The study 
of the variability is done using the supporting notation offered 
by FRAM, and an example shown in Figure 8 for the “Monitor 
traffic and separation” function. When needed the function can 
be decomposed into sub-functions and can be analysed with 
HAMSTERS if humans are a key element for that function. 
 
Figure 7: Role of the simulator 
Possible 
degradations 
System under 
analysis 
Simulator 
Input 
Generator 
Modeling 
process 
 Figure 8: Example of table to support the study of the function variability 
The SPAD simulator offers the possibility to show the 
outcome of the analysis, providing information about the status 
of the ATM functions of the different ACC. In particular, it can 
show the level of variability of the output of each function, the 
trend of the variability and the influence of the other functions. 
The output for the example described above is shown in figure 
9. The RPA flying from the segregated area A to the segregated 
area B is experiencing a malfunction as described above and a 
no fly safety area (represented with a grey ellipse) is generated 
by the ATCO of the Rome ACC. The no fly area cut the 
commercial flight path between Palermo and Catania and the 
related traffic has to be re-directed and to follow different flight 
path. This causes traffic perturbations and delays and oblige the 
ATCO to re-organise continuously the commercial traffic. The 
influence of this perturbation in terms of function variability 
estimated by the federation is shown in the left side of the 
simulator screen for all the ACC considered in the case study.  
If the interrelation between the functions leads to a variability 
that may affect system performance adversely, the analyst can 
adopt specific solutions and strategies to keep the output of the 
functions under control. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
The models of the federation are not intended to be used as 
stand-alone models but rather to support the analyst during his 
analysis. Then, the analyst is the mediator of the interaction 
between the models and he is the manager of the federation. 
The analysis remains human centred, that is, under the control 
and responsibility of the analyst and requires a significant 
contribution from analyst and operational experts with a 
significant degree of experience.  
This prevented a complete application of the federation to 
monitor in real time the behavior of a system whose dynamic 
and evolution is not compatible with the time required for the 
human analysis. On the other hand the federation offers a well-
structured and enlightening support to the analysis and 
Figure 9: Status of the ATM functions as presented by the simulator 
A 
B 
facilitate and guide the interaction between the analyst and the 
operational expert.  
Our experience in applying the federation shown that its 
usefulness depends from the purpose of the application. It can 
be very useful to support accident analysis, that is, to 
understand what happened. In this role it can offer a new 
perspective and point of view to understand what happened. 
The effort required for the application of the model federation 
is acceptable, however the results can depend on the expertise 
and the operational knowledge of the analyst and the 
operational experts supporting the analysis.  
The federation can also be useful as an instrument to 
support the analysis of a system, for example as a support to 
safety assessment and safety analysis, that is, to understand 
what may happen. However, in such a role the application 
effort is extensive because of the different instantiations 
required for each possible future event to be investigated. The 
effort can become unacceptable when the complexity of the 
system under analysis grows and if the analysis pretends to 
investigate all the possible future events. This implies the need 
to focus the analysis only on the most relevant parts of the 
system and choose the right combination of levels of 
granularity for its parts. Also in this role the federation can 
support interactions between the analyst and the operational 
experts. The representations and preliminary analysis of the 
federation can be used to elicit the opinion of the operational 
experts in a structured and stimulating way.  
The federation is of limited use to monitor a system in real 
time, that is, to understand what is happening. The analysis 
requires a significant human involvement and in most of the 
cases cannot be automated. In the case study presented in this 
paper the federation of models has been used off line to explore 
in advance a limited number of possible future events and 
estimate their possible consequences. If we consider the space 
of the possible future events as a two dimensional like in figure 
5, this means to investigate a small portion of it, like the one 
represented by the 4 grey areas. In our study the functioning of 
the system was monitored in real time, and if there was 
evidence that one of the explored events was going to happen, 
the estimate about the possible consequences was used to 
manage the event.  
 However, this procedure can be very expensive in terms of 
application effort, and the number of possible future events that 
can be investigated remains small. In addition, the selection of 
these events can be biased towards the most likely ones or 
those with the most severe consequences. 
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